I can’t show you the photos since they are so valuable that they remain under copywrite protection due to a series of laws that have extended the copywrite provisions (wouldn’t you know how that works LOL) but you may be able to see great photos HERE or HERE. I have exceeded my limit of free reads.
The struggle by the FBI to come to grips with what happened is documented HERE and HERE. Let’s just say that the FBI had a great deal of difficulty with this case and the direct participants were not brought to justice but the possible leader Al Capone showed above was never charged let alone convicted of this crime. He had created a perfect alibi. But the FBI got him for tax evasion.
Why am I telling you this story today? Certainly, it is appropriate to discuss what happened on Saint Valentine’s Day in the past and this day has a lot of history including in the distant past a celebration of Christian Martyrs and later a celebration of love due to a poem by Chaucer.
But today I am using this occasion to remember the Mob Killing in Chicago and another Massacre or near Massacre in the state where I live which is New Mexico. More importantly, the chances of what happened here in New Mexico happening again seem to me to be substantial. Accidents can happen at LANL, the WIPP facility southeast of Carlsbad Caverns in New Mexico or somewhere along the route from Los Alamos National Labs (LANL) to WIPP (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant – which appears to be planned now as the sole storage facility in the U.S) or somewhere on the route from LANL to Savannah and Savannah back to WIPP which is a long trip with many opportunities for the radioactive materials being conveyed to have an accident or be stolen by saboteurs.
It is a complicated topic but today we will mostly talk about the accident on February 14, 2014 at the WIPP facility southeast of Carlsbad Caverns National Park. You can learn more about WIPP HERE.
Let us now talk about this other Saint Valentine’s Day massacre or an accident that was almost a massacre (we do not really know the full impact on those involved) and one that likely will be repeated. Most of these images were provided to me by Cynthia Weehler. They are based on U.S. Government Documents so they should be considered accurate.
On February 14, 2014, radioactive materials leaked from a damaged storage drum. Analysis of accidents at the WIPP, by DOE, have shown lack of a “safety culture” at the facility.[19]
On February 5, 2014 at around 11:00 a.m., a salt haul truck caught fire, prompting an evacuation of the underground facility.[20] Six workers were taken to a local hospital with smoke inhalation and were released by the next day. Lab tests after the fire confirmed that there was zero release of radiological material during, or as a result of, the fire.[21] Underground air-monitoring equipment was out of commission after the truck fire.[22]
On February 15, 2014, authorities ordered workers to shelter in place at the facility after air monitors had detected unusually high radiation levels at 11:30 p.m. the previous day. None of the facility’s 139 workers were underground at the time of the incident.[23][24] Later, trace amounts of airborne radiation consisting of americium and plutonium particles were discovered above ground, 0.5 mi (0.80 km) from the facility.[23] In total, 22 workers were exposed to radioactive contaminants equaling that of a standard chest x-ray.[25] The Carlsbad Current-Argus wrote: “the radiation leak occurred on the evening of February 14, according to new information made public at a news conference [on February 20]. Joe Franco, manager of the DOE Carlsbad Field Office, said an underground air monitor detected high levels of alpha and beta radiation activity consistent [sic] the waste buried at WIPP.”[26] Regarding the elevated levels of plutonium and americium detected outside the nuclear waste repository, Ryan Flynn, New Mexico Environment Secretary stated during a news conference: “Events like this simply should never occur. From the state’s perspective, one event is far too many.”[27]
On February 26, 2014, the DOE announced that 13 WIPP above-ground workers had tested positive for exposure to radioactive material. Other employees were in the process of being tested. On Thursday, February 27, DOE announced that it sent out “a letter to tell people in two counties what they do know so far. Officials said it is too early to know what that means for the workers’ health.”[28] Additional testing would be done on employees who were working at the site the day after the leak. Above ground, 182 employees continued to work. A February 27 update included comments on plans to discover what occurred below ground first by using unmanned probes and then people.[29][30]
The Southwest Research and Information Center released a report on April 15, 2014[31] that one or more of 258 contact-handled radioactive waste containers located in room 7, panel 7 of the underground repository released radioactive and toxic chemicals.[32] The location of the leak was estimated to be approximately 1,500 feet (460 m) from the air monitor that triggered the contaminants in the filtration system. The contaminants were spread through more than 3,000 feet (910 m) of tunnels, leading to the 2,150-foot (660 m) exhaust shaft into the surrounding above-ground environment. Air-monitoring station #107, located 0.5 miles (0.8 km) away, detected the radiotoxins. The filter from station #107 was analyzed by the Carlsbad Environmental Monitoring and Research Center (CEMRC) and found to contain 0.64 becquerels (Bq) per cubic meter of air of americium-241 and 0.014 Bq of plutonium-239 and plutonium-240 per cubic meter of air (equivalent to 0.64 and 0.014 radioactive decay events per second per cubic meter of air).[33] The DOE agreed that there was a release of radioactivity from the repository and confirmed that “The event took place starting at 14 February 2014 at 23:14 and continued to 15 February 2014 14:45.”[34] The DOE also confirmed that “A large shift in wind direction can be seen to occur around 8:30 AM on 2/15/14.”[35][36] The EPA reported on the radiological release on their WIPP News page.[37]
After analysis by CEMRC, the station A filter was found on February 15, 2014 to be contaminated with 4,335.71 Bq of Am-241 per every 35 cubic feet (1 m3), and 671.61 Bq of plutonium-239 and plutonium-240 per every 35 cubic feet (1 m3).[38] Bob Alvarez, former DOE official, stated that the long-term ramifications of the WIPP issue are grounded in the fact that the DOE has 66,000 m3 (2,300,000 cu ft) of transuranic waste that has not been disposed of due to the fact that there are no long-term disposition plans for transuranic waste, including 5 tons of plutonium that are in-situ at the Savannah River Site, as well as water from the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in Washington State.[39] In an article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Alvarez wrote that “Wastes containing plutonium blew through the WIPP ventilation system, traveling 2,150 feet to the surface, contaminating at least 17 workers, and spreading small amounts of radioactive material into the environment.”[40] The URS Corporation, who oversees WIPP, removed and demoted the contracted manager of the repository. Alvarez ponders the notion of “contract handling” of radioactive waste because it deploys conventional processing practices that do not take into consideration the tens of thousands of containers buried before 1970 at several Department of Energy sites. Alvarez states that the quantity of this pre-1970 plutonium waste is 1,300 times more than the amount permitted to “leak” into the environment at WIPP; however, much of this waste is simply buried a few feet underground at DOE sites.[41]
The source of contamination was later found to be a barrel that exploded on February 14 because contractors at Los Alamos National Laboratory packed it with organiccat litter instead of clay cat litter. Other barrels with the same problem were then sealed in larger containers.[42] Anthropologist Vincent Ialenti has examined the political, social, and financial triggers to this organic kitty litter error in detail, linking it to the accelerated pace of the Department of Energy’s and State of New Mexico’s 3706 nuclear waste cleanup campaign, which ran from 2011 to 2014. Ialenti’s study was published in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in July 2018.[43]
The 2014 incidents raised the question of whether or not WIPP would be a safe replacement for the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository in Nevada, as a destination for all waste generated at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants.[5] The cost of the 2014 accident was expected to exceed $2 billion and disrupted other programs in various nuclear industry sites.[44] On January 9, 2017, the plant was formally reopened after three years of cleanup costing $500 million, which is significantly less than forecasted.[45] On April 10, the plant received its first shipment of waste since reopening.46]
Readers who found this article on the EconCurrents.com website may have to click “Read More” to read the rest of the article. Please do that as this is very important. If you have received a link to the article it will not be necessary to click “Read More”.
Many speculate that leadership of the world order is passing from the US to China. But a more likely outcome could be growing world political disorder and anarchy.
The complexity of analyzing a process as simple as flipping a coin three times raises concerns about how to describe reality in modeling. In dealing with coin flips, we have a known probability for the result of each flip. Also, many modeling scenarios may have more than three elementary steps. Additionally, the probabilities associated with elementary steps may not be known. How does this complicate the modeling process? This review will address that question with specific emphasis on social science models, especially economics.
What is the meaning of this and what are the Implications?
The case is No. 220141
Texas, Plaintiff
v.
New Mexico and Colorado
Docketed:
January 10, 2013
You can track the filings HERE and perhaps better yet HERE.
It is winding to a close and in my opinion the only result is that two Special Masters and a lot of attorneys have made a lot of money. But that is a different topic and I will write an article on the case when the Supreme Court makes its final decision.
The topic of this article is the Amici Curiae (Amici is the plural of Amicus) Brief by 23 states which is presented in its entirety in the body of this article. Some may have to click on “read more” to access the body of the article with the full filing.
Normally under Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution. only states are parties to a dispute among states.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.
Due to what IMO was a misstep by the New Mexico Attorney General, The U.S. Solicitor General was asked to comment on whether the Supreme Court should give Texas the right to bring this case and this then led to the U.S. requesting the right to be an Intervenor and that right was granted.
Intervening is entry into a lawsuit by a third party into an existing civil case that was not named as an original party but has a personal stake in the outcome. The non-party who intervenes in a case is called an intervenor. But they are not a party to the case. It is a subtle difference but an important difference.
Recently the Parties to this case agreed on a settlement but the the U.S., an intervenor has objected to the settlement. The disposition of that objection has yet to be decided.
23 States not involved in the litigation have submitted an Amici Curiae Brief sharing with the court their belief that the objections of the U.S. should be rejected.
So this raises two questions among others:
A. Why do they care?
B. What are the implications of their objection being accepted or rejected?
I am not an attorney. The full Amici Curiae brief is in the body of this article. But I will try to extract from that brief some of the objections raised to the U.S. intervening in disputes among states especially when they involve river compacts. The quotes below in many cases are from within a paragraph in the Brief so the line breaks may be different than in the Brief.
If a dispute arises regarding an interstate water compact, the state parties to thecompact have the authority to resolve these disputes among themselves. State sovereignty and principles offederalismprevent undue interference from theUnited States when the United States is not a party to the compact.
The United Statesassertsanexpandedfederal role in interstate water compactdisputes that, if accepted by the Court, would result in the ability of the United States to insert itself into the equitable apportionment and governance of water among theStates.AmiciStates have a strong interest in avoiding that result.
States entering into compacts must have the abil- ity to comply with, interpret, enforce, and defend their negotiated agreements on behalf of their citizens with- out undue interference from the United States.
The United States has no role in the
administration of state water to meet compact
obligations. The administration and distribution of
state water is a “core attribute of state sovereignty.”
In entering into interstate water compacts, States
do not presume that they are waiving or limiting their
sovereign rights with respect to the United States. It
is a “well-established principle that States do not
easily cede their sovereign powers,” and silence is not
construed as a waiver of sovereignty.
Unless a compacting State expressly cedes its
sovereign authority, the United States does not have
a role in the management of state water, including the
interpretation or enforcement of interstate water
compacts.
The United States cannot and should not be able
to interfere with the sovereign authority of the States
to manage their water by pursuing compact claims or
an apportionment of water that is different than that
agreed to by compacting States. Accordingly, to the ex-
tent the United States participates in the administra-
tion or use of state water, it must comply with state
law.
The United States’ Federal Water Project Does
Not Expand Its Limited Role in This Interstate
Water Compact Dispute.
In limited circumstances, the Court may permit
the federal government to intervene in compact suits
to defend “distinctively federal interests.” Texas, 583
U.S. at 413 (quoting Maryland, 451 U.S. at 745, n.21).
But such limited intervention does not include
authority to determine the apportionment of water
between States or management of water within
States.
Specifically, the United States seeks to insert itself
into the division of water among the States and into
the governance of state water within the borders of the
States. The United States argues it has a role in
determining Compact compliance regarding the
division of water between New Mexico and Texas and
in the appropriation and use of groundwater in New
Mexico.
The Court should reject the United States’ attempt
to expand its power in this way. If the Court accepts
the United States’ argument, the inevitable result
will be further efforts by the United States to insert
itself into the interpretation and enforcement of
other interstate water compacts. The Court should
reject this obvious affront to federalism and
States’ sovereign powers.
Nor can the United States justify its role in the
enforcement or interpretation of compact terms be-
cause there is a federal water project associated with
the Compact. See Exception at 30–34. Federal water
projects do not supersede interstate water compacts or
the States’ authority to manage their water to meet
compact obligations. The mere existence of a federal
water project associated with compact water does not
give the United States a role in the division of water
between States or in enforcing or interpreting terms
of an interstate water compact to which the United
States is not a party.
.
Federal law requires the United States to
comply with state law relating to the control,
appropriation, and distribution of water in federal
water projects.
.
This provision requires the federal government, in
operating reclamation projects, to comply with state
water law and state water allocations. Water stored in
federal water projects must be appropriated and man-
aged subject to state law. Further, through the
McCarran Amendment, the United States has waived
its sovereign immunity and defers to state law regard-
ing the determination and administration of water
rights for federal reclamation projects. 43 U.S.C.
§ 666. The fact that water subject to a compact is also
associated with a federal water project does not dimin-
ish the sovereign authority of the State parties to the
compact or give the United States expanded control
over the compact terms or distribution of water under
the compact.
.
That does not mean, however, that the United
States is without recourse. If the United States has a
claim regarding water appropriated to it in relation to
a federal water project, the United States, like all
other water right holders, may turn to state courts to
protect project water rights.
The existence of a federal water project does not
give the United States authority to interpose its pre-
ferred interpretation or enforcement of interstate wa-
ter compact terms.
I do not know if I have done a good job of selecting the best excerpts from the filing but the full filing is in the body of this article. I suggest that those interested in this subject read it. One way of looking at the arguments in this Amici Curiae filing is a separation of powers argument. It is also a Federalism argument. The Amici argue that it is not up to the U.S. to tell them how to implement agreements reached among states. Congress may ratify these agreements and the U.S. Supreme Court may hear disputes. But the implementation of the agreements is determined by state law not the Federal Government. Even if there is a Federal Project that is related to or interconnected with agreements among states, this does not give the Federal Government the right to interfere in how states implement and enforce their agreements with other states.
I am assuming that the Special Master will agree with the arguments made by New Mexico, Colorado and Texas which mirror the arguments made in this Amici Curiae Brief or it may be the other way around and I expect the Supreme Court to accept the recommendations of the Special Master.
Doing so would clarify this matter. If the Special Master does not accept the arguments presented by Colorado, New Mexico and Texas or if the Supreme Court does not accept the recommendation by the Special Master to accept this interpretation of the role of the Federal Government in the administration of river compacts (and I think it extends to other interstate compacts), it would represent a sea change in the relationship between the states and the Federal Government. The sovereignty of states would be significantly compromised. But there could be some nuances involved.
A friend of mine is continually reminding me that much water law in the U.S. springs from another somewhat related case: United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899)
So this sort of confirms his assessment of the history of water law in the U.S.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Germany is abandoning its intimate relationship with Russia. But when peace eventually returns, Germany may find it difficult to resist returning to the embrace of Russian friendship.
The Marshall Plan is widely regarded as the greatest achievement of postwar US foreign policy. But do calls for a new Marshall Plan for a postwar Ukraine make sense?
Photo of war damage in Kyev by Jade Koroliuk on Unsplash.
Click the picture for a large image. Back arrow to return to this page.
In this article, I present the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decision in case No. 21-60743 relating to the rejection of a license to store spent nuclear power plant rods from out of state in a facility in Texas.
It is a long decision as court decisions usually are. It may be a strange way to introduce the enormous topic of the storage of nuclear waste. There are two main types of nuclear waste:
A. Related to Nuclear Weapons
B. Related to Nuclear Fission Energy Plants (this case is related to this category of nuclear waste but the two topics are very intertwined)
There are other minor categories including medical.
The common characteristic in all categories of nuclear waste is generally no one wants to store it. There are many reasons for that. Some are obvious. By no one, I mean no states. Some communities see the storage of nuclear waste as an economic development opportunity.
I am reporting on this decision mostly because it is recent and addresses the state’s rights aspects of the problem. If you read the decision carefully, you will glean additional information.
I will summarize some of that at the end of the article.
I know that court decisions are boring but this topic is very important. Some of the environmental issues were touched in this decision but the issue of the transport of nuclear waste and the risk this creates was only hinted at.
This is a large problem for the U.S. and many other nations and I have had difficulty addressing it because of all the complications and the large amount of information that is important to understand. In this case, the focus was on legal issues so it was perhaps a good way to introduce the topic. The legal issues are extremely important but the technical issues are also extremely important. I will be getting into those in future articles and I plan to write a number of articles on this topic because of its importance.
At the end of the article, there is an opportunity to submit comments and I encourage readers to do so. It is usually better to submit a comment that way than to me directly because more people will see the comment and responses by me and others to the comment will also be seen by others. So it stimulates discussion. Please feel free to send this article to anyone who you think will benefit from reading it.
Today, US/China relations are at virtually their lowest ebb since US President Nixon went to China in 1972. How did relations end up in such a parlous state? What does the future hold?
