Despite frequent US calls to lift defence spending, most of NATO’s European members pocketed a ‘peace dividend’ in recent years by reducing their armed forces and defence industries. They imagined that war would never return to Europe and that, in any event, they could rely on the US to ensure their national security.
Both of these assumptions were illusory, as Keir Giles argues in a new book, Who Will Defend Europe? Giles is a senior fellow at Chatham House and Director of the Conflict Studies Research Centre. He has been a very active and prescient analyst of Russia, especially since the invasion of Ukraine, notably through his books Moscow Rules and Russia’s War on Everybody.
Overview
As Giles notes, many commentators are wont to argue that Russia can no longer be considered a major security threat. It has not been able to achieve its ambitious goal of conquering Ukraine despite its large size advantage and has lost enormous numbers of troops and military equipment.
But this viewpoint is shortsighted, writes Giles. Russia has built back its land forces in tandem with its losses. And the rest of Russia’s military – the Air Force, the Navy, and the nuclear forces – are relatively unscathed. If and when hostilities halt, Russia can quickly rebuild its military for more adventurism. Indeed, according to Giles’ off-the-record interviews with European defence and intelligence chiefs, Russia would be preparing for its next attack upon a European NATO member country in the coming few years.
UK MI5 Director General Ken McCallum highlighted the enormous challenge of countering the Russia challenge beyond the traditional battlefield in a recent speech where he said
“While the Russian military grinds away on the battlefield, at a horrendous human cost, we’re also seeing Putin’s henchmen seeking to strike elsewhere, in the misguided hope of weakening Western resolve.” [Russia] “is on a sustained mission to generate mayhem on British and European streets: we’ve seen arson, sabotage and more.”
Gen John R. Allen, former commander of NATO International Security Assistance Force, said,
“Europe should expect that Russia will exploit to the fullest, not just the vulnerabilities it can create, but the vulnerabilities Europe has created for itself.”
US role
Giles also argues that irrespective of who wins the upcoming US presidential elections, the US will be less committed to defending NATO’s European members. Through the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, it is apparent that the US is more committed to defending Israel than Ukraine, with much fewer restrictions being placed on Israel’s use of American military equipment than on Ukraine. Also, US military leaders in the Indo-Pacific are competing for resources against US NATO leaders in light of the possibility of a conflict with China in 2027, which is widely considered a greater priority than Europe.
Russia may challenge NATO directly
One of the most insightful chapters deals with some of the nitty-gritty of NATO. Giles floated a possible scenario of Russia challenging NATO unity directly with a very small and limited attack on a European NATO member. A weak NATO response could indirectly undermine the alliance by revealing that defence commitments were not as strong as imagined. Another scenario could involve the US restricting the use of its weapon systems out of fear of escalation, as it does for Ukraine, in the case of a European NATO member being attacked by Russia.
Giles describes Ukraine as a shield holding back Russian aggression from Europe – but European reactions are quite diverse. “Front-line” states like Poland and Finland take the Russian challenge seriously by ramping up defence expenditure. Germany has announced a major increase in defense expenditure, but it will take a long time to translate into vastly improved capabilities. Moreover, while most European NATO countries are now aiming to achieve the NATO target of defence spending of 2 percent of GDP, it seems abundantly clear that very much higher defence spending will be necessary.
UK role
Giles is rather despondent about the state of the military in the UK, his home country, where it seems to be in shambles. While the new Labour government’s strategic defence review is welcome, it postpones the timing of military reform by one year—and in any event, the government has announced that it will not increase defence spending.
Another concern is Giles’ perception that because of the current soft and comfortable lifestyle, the UK public may not unite to defend its nation and values, as it did during World War 2. While the same concern applies to some other European countries, the need to defend your country and values is relatively easy to sell in Sweden, Finland, and Poland.
European Complacency
Giles also laments the reluctance of some leaders to speak openly about the gravity of Europe’s security situation. Most European economic and political systems have just not woken up to the threat; if they have, they are not doing anything about it. The European public is mostly not conscious of their countries’ security threats.
The Ukraine war is a new chapter in military combat, with the use of drones and other advanced technologies. Both Russia and Ukraine have been innovating on the battlefield, while front-line states are also observing and learning. Although physically distant from the theatre of war, the US has seized on lessons from the frontline, although its gigantic military machine is less agile. Disappointingly, there is no evidence of such learning taking place in the UK or other leading European countries.
Giles also despairs the continuing large trade flows between Europe and Russia, which are enabling Russia’s war effort. Trade sanctions need better enforcement, agility, and a greater sense of urgency.
Why does Russia project this kind of aggression?
Giles argues that “Russianness” is hard to understand because, superficially, both the country and its people resemble white members of the Euro-Atlantic Community. But the traditional Russian system remains. It is one of expansionism and aggression, resource extraction more than production, and a punitive culture and justice system—this was frozen in time during the Czarist and Soviet systems. Thus, today, 19th-century Russian attitudes have burst onto an unsuspecting Europe.
Conclusion
Overall, “Who will defend Europe?” is a very well-written book that offers many detailed insights and perspectives on the gravity of Europe’s security situation, which has important spillover effects on the entire world.
